Minister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders' statements and parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership were most significant. An additional factor -the role of historical precedent -was also important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical development and empirical research.
'A leader humbled, a nation cut down to size' (Rachman 2013 Washington. Ultimately, no military strikes against Syria were taken at that time. In the words one Labour MP, 'this was a great parliamentary moment and it did affect events. There was no bombing' (BBC 2014) .
This was an unusual case of a parliament defying a PM's preference on a decision to deploy military force. This vote was unprecedented in UK politics and challenges conventional wisdom that Westminster has little influence in security policy. Yet this case also resembles instances of parliamentary influence elsewhere and the factors that explain this vote are consistent with other cases. After a brief description of the backdrop to the vote, we establish the theoretical context of parliaments' role in security policy, setting out the general expectation that parliaments are not particularly influential. At the heart of the article we consider -through a consolidation of previous research -factors that facilitate parliamentary influence in security policy and examine the impact they each had in the Syria vote. In concluding,
we use this case to suggest directions for future research. Our aim is to explain this particular vote and to advance research and understanding about the role of parliaments in security policy. We ground our analysis of parliamentary influence in a conceptualisation of political dynamics focusing on group and individual actors from a decision-making perspective.
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The Domestic and International Context of the Vote
Cameron's preference for some form of intervention in the Syrian conflict was long signposted. As early as May 2011 he adopted a hawkish line and announced, in
March 2013, that he was seriously considering arming the Syrian rebels, in violation of an agreed EU arms embargo (Stacey et al. 2013) . This was consistent with
Cameron's established instinct towards liberal interventionism, most prominently displayed in response to the Libyan civil war of 2011 (Beech 2011; Beech and Oliver 2014) . After the 21 August 2013 chemical attack in Damascus, Cameron and Obama agreed that a robust response was required from the international community if credible evidence suggested the Syrian government was responsible (Chulov and Helm 2013) .
Syrian president Assad agreed to admit UN inspectors to the attack site the next day, after suggestions from both US and UK governments that military action was likely. The inspectors arrived in Syria on 26 August but struggled to gain access to the sites, delaying completion of their work (BBC 2013b) . Military commanders in the US, France, and the UK began to discuss plans for a 48-hour cruise missile attack against military assets inside Syria (Financial Times 2013) . In an attempt to build legitimacy for any strike, the UK moved to secure a UN Security Council resolution (Ross 2013) . It quickly became clear that both Russia and China opposed such a resolution (BBC 2013c) . Regional actors such as Iran criticised any military action while Jordan announced it would not permit any strikes to be launched from its territory.
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Against this backdrop of division and uncertainty in the international community, Cameron returned early from vacation and recalled Parliament for a vote. Alongside
William Hague (UK Foreign Secretary) and Nick Clegg (UK Deputy PM and Leader of the Liberal Democrats in the coalition government), Cameron met with opposition
Labour party leader Ed Miliband on 27 August. At that meeting, Miliband stressed that support from Labour would only be offered for action that was '"legal, specifically limited to deterring the future use of chemical weapons" and has "clear and achievable military goals"' (Rigby and Pickard 2013) . In a call to Cameron that evening, Miliband reportedly emphasised the need to give the UN inspectors time to conclude their work ).
The following day Miliband met again with Cameron and was shown a draft of the government motion -authorising the use of military force -that would be put (Hansard, 29 Aug 2013 : Col. 1425 .
Despite Cameron's arguments, hours later the government motion was defeated.
The outcome of the vote was stunning. Neither motion was supported. The government proposal was defeated 285 to 272 votes. Cameron, visibly surprised, confirmed that the UK would not participate in military action against Syria under any circumstances and that he had no intention of bringing the issue back to the Commons for further consideration.
Parliamentary Influence in Security Policy
The vote presents a challenge to conventional understandings of parliamentary influence in security policy and to the traditional picture of the Commons in the Parliaments are particularly weak in 'high politics' and security policy (see Ku 2004) . Parliaments lack the knowledge and expertise to challenge powerful foreign and defence ministries and 'most parliamentarians remain quite parochial and national in their concerns' (Greene 2004: 30) . In addition, the need to present a united front toward 'the enemy' is a security imperative by which parliaments often abide.
Legislative deference to government and party leaders is quite common and once 7 hostilities commence, parliamentarians tend to rally behind the government (Peters and Wagner 2011) .
Recent research, however, challenges this conventional view of parliamentary weakness in security policy (Author 2010). Work inspired by Putnam's (1988) twolevel game metaphor has examined how parliaments can shape domestic win-sets (the range of acceptable options to domestic constituents) through ratification and veto powers, which affects both the likelihood of international agreements and the advantages that domestic constraints can give leaders in international bargaining (Pahre 1997; Martin 2001; Hill 2003) . Research on the role of political oppositions (Hagan 1993 ) and decision units (Hagan and Hermann 2001) also notes the importance of parliaments as centres for opposition and as potential veto players in fluid and dynamic decision making practices that exist alongside institutional authority. Parliamentary accountability is identified as one mechanisms underlying the structural explanation of the democratic peace (the notable lack of war between dyads of democracies) (Wagner 2006) . Dietrich et al. (2008) argue that the democratic peace should be characterised as the 'parliamentary peace' because parliaments are the democratic institutions most likely to respond to war-averse public opinion. Unpacking the structural explanation of the democratic peace, research has examined varying levels of parliamentary constraints. This diverse research demonstrates the presence of parliaments in foreign and security policy and offers implicit suggestions on the conditions under which parliaments are important.
3
From this wide-ranging research, we consolidate and specify several facilitating factors for parliamentary influence in security policy. They include:
• Institutional powers of parliament;
8
• Public opinion;
• Cabinet type;
• Intraparty factions; and
• Prime Ministerial (PM) leadership style.
These factors can, and often do, act together, but here we present the logic of each separately. Furthermore, none are deterministic; there are caveats to the logic of each of them. Following a comparative, general analysis of factors for parliamentary influence in foreign and security policy, we apply these to the Syria vote.
Institutional, Legal and Constitutional Authority
Parliaments with more institutional, legal, and constitutional authority in foreign affairs are in a better position to influence security policy. Research on two-level games, decision units, and the democratic peace notes real variation in parliamentary powers in foreign affairs (see Pahre 1997; Wagner 2006; Mello 2012) . Born (2004: 209-11) classifies parliamentary powers in security affairs in terms of 'authority' ('the power which Parliament uses to hold government accountable ... derived from the constitutional and legal framework as well as customary practices'), 'ability' (the parliamentary resources of special committees, budget and staff necessary to use legal authority), and 'attitude' (the 'willingness to hold the executive to account'). Focusing specifically on legal and constitutional war powers (including budgetary control, oversight, and the right to veto executive use of force), Peters and Wagner (2011: 175) find a range of models parliamentary roles, 'from complete exclusion to a comprehensive veto position of parliament over all potential deployments. In between these two extremes, democracies have found a wide variety of solutions'. They report,
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for example, that less than one third of democracies hold ex ante veto power over military missions (Peters and Wagner 2011) . Democratic peace research that unpacks institutional accountability in parliaments has also focused on the degree of executive autonomy from the legislature and treaty ratification powers (Peterson 1995 ).
These differences have policy consequences. Consider the Iraq case: countries with parliaments having only 'basic' or 'deficient' war powers became more involved militarily, while those with 'comprehensive' powers made little or no contribution (Dieterich et al. 2008 ). In their study on variation in treaty ratification procedures, Reiter and Tillman (2002) found that countries affording stronger voice to legislatures in treaties were less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes.
Beyond formal ratification and war powers, parliaments can play an important role in security policy through their ability to supervise, scrutinize, and investigate, and through budgetary controls (Hill 2003) .
Some argue there is a trend toward institutionalisation of parliamentary influence in foreign affairs (Damrosch 2003; Raunio and Wiberg 2001) . Yet, in their study of post-Cold War trends in parliamentary powers, Peters and Wagner (2011: 185) conclude that veto powers have not increased and that 'parliaments usually lose powers when existing provisions are substantially modified'. Furthermore, they argue that NATO expansion and the rise of multilateral operations negatively affected parliamentary control over deployment decisions.
There are three important caveats to the institutional, legal, and constitutional authority factor. First, as Pahre (1997) 
Public Opinion
Security issues that are salient to the public, and public opinion that challenges the government's preference, can facilitate parliamentary influence in security policy (Reiter and Tillman 2002; Dietrich et al 2009; Author 2010) . If the cabinet is out of touch with the sense of the country, parliaments may play their role of representing the will of the people. Unlike the cabinet, which is accountable to parliament, MPs are directly accountable to and elected by the public. Thus, MPs not serving in government may be more sensitive to public opinion and see public opposition as an opportunity to make electoral gains, particularly if an election is looming. This is especially true for opposition parties. With few other routes for influencing policy, opposition parties can seize on public opinion to force a role for parliament in foreign policy. Given public opposition, ruling parties may also use parliaments to provide legitimacy for security operations and to avoid subsequent criticism by parliamentary opposition. According to Peters and Wagner (2011: 183-84) this may, in certain cases, 'give parliamentarians some influence on the operation … consultations may become such a common practice that it develops into a de facto obligation that is acknowledged by both government and parliament even in the absence of any legal obligation'.
One caveat to this factor is that public opinion may have a direct impact on foreign policy, completely bypassing parliament. In other words, the PM and cabinet may also be sensitive to public opposition and change policy to comply. Evidence for this direct role of public opinion is decidedly mixed (see Holsti 
Coalition Government
A governing elite that is divided and institutionalised in a coalition government is another factor facilitating parliamentary influence in security policy. Coalitions are often seen as inherently fragile and weak, and more vulnerable to parliamentary pressures (Auerswald 1999; Palmer et al. 2004) . Whereas a single party cabinet 'can count on legislative approval for its … policy positions largely because voting against the government implies handing it over to the opposition', coalition partners may disagree over security policy and then may go to parliament to seek support from other parties (Elman 2000: 98) . For this reason, and the built-in multiple veto players coalitions, democratic peace researchers have argued that coalitions will be more constrained in security policy than single0party counterparts (Maoz and Russett 1993) .
Others suggest the dynamics of coalition politics can produce hijacking of policy by junior parties with blackmail potential and disproportionate influence and diversionary behaviour with extreme foreign policies designed to distract publics and parliaments from coalition fragility (Hagan 1993; Elman 2000) . Three caveats are important. First, coalition partners often agree on security policy, leaving no room for parliamentary intervention. Second, coalition partners often work out their differences within the coalition. Even if the government falls over a security policy issue, it may be due to one partner withdrawing from the coalition and parliament may not be involved. Finally, coalitions may act no differently than factionalized single parties. Leblang and Chan (2003) argue that consensual politics of intra-party consultation may be just as constraining as competitive politics of inter-party consultation.
Intraparty Factionalism
When leaders cannot discipline their party, parliaments become involved in decisionmaking. Parties may be factionalized on the specific policy, on the general policy orientation, or on personal or political lines for which foreign policy may be strategically used to shore up support intra-party party. Although there is little work on the effects of intraparty politics on foreign policy (see Hazan 2000) , research on political oppositions suggests that single-party governments with 'well-defined internal divisions' may have to deal with difficult parliamentary backbenchers (Hagan 1993 ).
One caveat is that even if divisions exist, leaders have many institutional, political, and normative sources for influencing party discipline (see Kam 2009; Andeweg and Thomassen 2010) . Also, as Hazan (2000) points out, intraparty factionalism does not occur in a vacuum and is connected to public opinion in complicated ways -party factions may be driven by and responsive to cleavages in public opinion and may hinder party leaders' abilities to 'sell' a policy to the public.
PM Leadership
Leaders are not all equally and rationally tuned to opposition within their parties or in parliament. Leaders also vary in their skills for and orientations toward conflict 
Explaining the Commons' Vote on Syria
How well do the general factors of parliamentary influence account for the Syria vote? In this section, we consider the role of the factors identified above. We also explore other dynamics that were important in this case but have not been directly addressed in previous research on parliaments and security policy.
Institutional, Legal and Constitutional Authority
It is problematic to attribute Parliament's role in this vote to any specific institutional, legal or constitutional authority. The UK Parliament is at the 'weak' end of a spectrum of control over security policy, in comparative perspective (White 2003; DCAF 2006; Dieterich et al. 2008; Peters and Wagner 2011) . Deploying UK military force is a Royal Prerogative -'the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown', the executive (Dicey 1959: 24) . The authority to deploy the UK's armed forces, constitutionally, resides in the collective responsibility of the cabinet, led by the PM. This is consistent with the Westminster model of governance characterised by top-down decisionmaking processes and centralisation of power; it is 'a "power-hoarding" or "powerconcentrating" model of democracy' (Gaskarth 2013: 28 ; see also Strong 2014;).
Overall, UK cabinets have considerable ability to bypass parliament and the democratic process when making security policy (Burrall et al. 2006 ). 
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The salience of such public opinion to MPs was notable during the debate in the Commons. Speakers frequently invoked poll results and almost all references in the debate linked public opposition to fallout from Iraq, a topic to which we return below.
Prominent figures, including former Labour foreign secretary Jack Straw and former
Conservative defence secretary Liam Fox, also directly referenced public opposition (Hansard 2013 : Cols. 1450 , 1452 . Other vocal and recognisable MPs raised the issue as well (Cols. 1475 (Cols. -76, 1479 (Cols. , 1483 (Cols. , 1506 (Cols. , 1508 (Cols. , 1513 (Cols. , 1515 (Cols. , 1521 (Cols. , 1535 .
Despite such frequent references, it is important to keep the role of public opinion in perspective. It is certainly not the case that the Commons simply followed the Such a scenario would have made it politically far more difficult for parliament to vote against the use of force (or, in that scenario, the continued use of force).
Furthermore, public opinion -specifically a desire to be seen as both reflecting opinion and inflicting a defeat on the government in the name of public opinion -may have influenced Miliband's decision not to back the government motion (BBC 2014).
Coalition Government
There is little evidence to suggest that the coalition itself (the first multiparty cabinet If there was any possibility of a handful of wavering Conservative and Liberal Democrat MPs being won over by strong closing speeches -and that is mere speculation -then Clegg's speech was arguably ill-suited to the task. The important point, however, is that the leadership of both parties in the coalition supported the government motion, as did the majority of MPs from their parties. Rather than coalition politics, or inter-party tensions, playing a decisive role in this defeat, intraparty divisions were far more significant.
Intraparty Factionalism
Both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties were internally divided on this 
PM Leadership
Cameron's leadership style, and broader party management processes, exacerbated intraparty tensions, particularly those within the Conservative party. As one backbench Conservative MP put it, 'it all comes down to loyalty. Who do you want to be loyal to, your prime minister or your constituents? The point is that backbenchers know that Cameron doesn't really mean it, that he wouldn't die in a ditch for them' (Hardman 2013b) . Such underlying tensions were aggravated by a distinct sense of confidence in Cameron's approach. Recalling Parliament in such a haphazard manner, attempting to rush through a vote before the UN inspectors completed their work, and refusing to disclose comprehensively the legal advice received by the UK Government, were all signs that Cameron underestimated the degree of opposition.
In addition, there are indications that the vote itself was poorly managed.
Complicating matters considerably was Miliband's late decision to whips will be getting to work today' (Hardman 2013a One senior backbench Conservative cited this poor party management and a failure to prepare the ground as pivotal in the loss (Lilley 2013) . In the days before the vote, scepticism amongst as many as 70 Conservative MPs was reported, deriving from a combination of a rushed timetable and a failure to make a compelling case for 25 intervention (Mason 2013) . As the debate proceeded in the Commons, government whips were engaged in a too little, too late effort to bring rebels on board. Notes were passed around the chamber, wavering MPs were called in for last minute meetings with ministers and senior advisers, and party loyalty was invoked. However, the groundwork had not been laid in the days and weeks prior (BBC 2014).
Numerous news stories in the aftermath of the vote reported that Cameron and his senior Cabinet colleagues did not meet privately with many wavering backbenchers.
According to the Financial Times, 'plenty of rebels have told us in the last 48 hours they were not properly consulted before the vote, and that they might have changed their mind had they been talked through the prime minister's reasoning' (Stacey 2013) . Similar criticism was directed at the government whips office (Rigby 2013; Groves 2013 ). In The Telegraph, a Conservative MP was quoted as saying that it felt like the whips just 'couldn't be bothered' (Dominiczak and Tweedie 2013) . Summing up, one Conservative minister was quoted saying, 'it was a catalogue of errors.
Bringing back parliament in a rush; failing to get Ed Miliband on board; failing to eke out enough support for the government motion despite having a working majority of 84: the whole thing is a shambles' (Rigby 2013) .
The Ghosts of Iraq and the Shadow of Tony Blair
A final contributing factor to Parliament's role and the outcome of this vote, and one that has not been explored in previous research on parliamentary influence, was the memory of the Blair government's decision to support the U. In this case public opinion was a significant, but indirect, factor. While public scepticism may explain Cameron's decision to recall parliament, Miliband's positioning of the Labour party, and the decision of some MPs to vote against the government, politicians did not blindly follow public opinion. This is evident from the closeness of the vote and the reality that a majority of MPs voted to retain the option of force. This is consistent with research demonstrating that united elites can ignore or shape public opinion. It was division among elites that allowed for some representation of public opinion in the form of a parliamentary debate and vote.
Contra to some democratic peace research, in this case the junior coalition partner did not act as a brake on military action. The divided elite in this case was not the result of coalition politics; the governing parties were in agreement. The key division was within the Conservative party, the senior coalition partner, and was linked to longer-standing intraparty tensions. This is consistent with previous research on the constraining role party factions can play. It also suggests that further research is required on the role of political parties, and their ideological commitments and disagreements, in the area of foreign policy. Little systematic research exists on the topic (see Rathbun 2004; Özkececi-Taner 2009 leaders. Yet in this case party management was critically lacking. This is consistent with previous research, which shows that not all leaders respond rationally to constraints and challenges. Cameron seemed to misperceive the opposition on his own backbenches and underestimate the leadership required to secure votes.
A critical factor in this case that has no foundation in past work on parliaments and security policy is the significance of historical context. The 'ghosts' of Iraq and Blair affected both public and MP opinion. But this history was not determinate -the UK was willing to intervene in Libya (2011) Research on individual-level information processing suggests that historical analogies and case-based reasoning can serve as a prism through which a current policy choice is perceived, evaluated, and acted upon (Khong 1992; Bruening 2003) .
Past experience may affect policy preferences, levels of trust, and policymaking processes. Iraq and Blair served as shortcuts and bases for arguments for more time, more evidence, and more involvement by parliament as a check on the executive. The role of historical precedent seems a particularly fruitful and novel area for research on parliaments and foreign policy.
Overall, although some aspects of this case seem fairly idiosyncratic (for example two government ministers failed to hear the bell calling them to vote), the case 30 resonates with extant research that points to dynamic constellations of factors beyond structural contexts and institutional rules. The Commons vote helps us better understand these factors and how they interact to enhance parliamentary influence in security policy.
NOTES
1 In 1782 Lord North, then PM, lost a vote of no confidence following the British defeat at Yorktown.
2 The Labour amendment differed in setting out a clearer and more structured role for the UN in any intervention and in calling for compelling evidence that the Syrian government was responsible for the chemical attacks.
3 For more detailed discussion of how this research challenges the conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence in foreign policy, see Author (2010) . 4 For some efforts to increase parliament's involvement prior to the Iraq war see White (2003) . 
